

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00  
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FM USMISSION GENEVA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2562  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 11521

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-3  
TAGS: PARM US UK UR  
SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: NSS WORKING GROUP, JULY 21  
AND 25

CTB MESSAGE NO. 271

1. SUMMARY: NSS WORKING GROUP MET ON JULY 21 AND 25. US  
DEL PRESSED SOVIET DEL ON DETAILS OF THEIR NATIONAL SEIS-  
MIC STATIONS (NSS) PROPOSAL AND GAVE US DEL UNDERSTANDING  
OF SEVERAL POINTS. IN RESPONSE, SOVIET DEL ELABORATED ON  
ITS PROPOSAL IN WAY WHICH MADE CLEAR THERE WERE SIGNIFI-  
CANT DIFFERENCES OF VIEW ON SEVERAL ASPECTS BUT WHICH  
CONTAINED SOME POSITIVE ELEMENTS. TARASOV (USSR), READING  
FROM PREPARED STATEMENT (SEPTTEL), SAID MOST DETAILS ON  
TIMING, INSTALLATION, PROVISION FOR NEW SITES AND SITE  
SELECTION, AND UPGRADED EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN  
JOINT CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION (JCC). A LIMITED NUMBER OF  
CHARACTERISTICS FOR UPGRADED EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE AGREED  
UPON IN THE JCC, AND PARTIES SHOULD HAVE RIGHT TO USE ANY  
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SEISMIC STATIONS WHICH MEET THEM REGARDLESS OF WHERE THEY  
WERE MANUFACTURED. TARASOV JUSTIFIED PROPOSAL FOR USE OF  
MAGNETIC TAPE FOR EXCHANGE OF SEISMIC DATA AS LEAST COSTLY  
APPROACH, WHICH WAS THEREFORE APPROPRIATE IN VIEW OF  
LIMITED DURATION OF TREATY AND UNCERTAINTY ABOUT ITS  
BEING EXTENDED. ON POSITIVE SIDE, TARASOV CONFIRMED THAT  
DATA WOULD BE CONTINUOUSLY RECORDED AND THAT ALL OF IT

WOULD BE PROVIDED. HE DID NOT RULE OUT USE OF US EQUIPMENT FOR UPGRADED STATIONS; INDICATED THAT SOVIETS WOULD CONSIDER AGREEING ON EQUIPMENT CHARACTERISTICS NOW PROVIDED OTHER SEISMIC DATA EXCHANGE ISSUES WERE RESOLVED; SAID THAT OVERALL TIMING OF STAGES FOR IMPLEMENTING ADDITIONAL DATA EXCHANGE MIGHT BE AGREED NOW; AND EXPRESSED STRONG INTEREST IN AND ASKED FOR A MORE DETAILED PROPOSAL ON US SUGGESTED AUTHENTICATION SCHEME. END SUMMARY.

2. AT JULY 21 NSS WORKING GROUP, FINCH (US) RESPONDED TO SOVIET DEL PROPOSAL FOR A TWO-STAGE SEISMIC DATA EXCHANGE PROGRAM UNDER THE SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT (CTB NO. 263) BY DESCRIBING PROPOSAL AS US DEL UNDERSTOOD IT. IT APPEARED THAT, ASIDE FROM QUESTION OF TIMING AND CHARACTERISTICS OF EQUIPMENT TO BE USED, US PROPOSAL AFTER NSS WERE INSTALLED WOULD CORRESPOND TO THE SECOND STAGE IN THE SOVIET PROPOSAL. US DEL ASSUMED THAT SOVIET DEL PROPOSAL FOR UPGRADING EXISTING SEISMIC STATIONS IN SECOND STAGE UNDER ITS PROPOSAL WOULD PERMIT INSTALLING NEW EQUIPMENT AT TECHNICALLY APPROPRIATE SITES. ON NSS EQUIPMENT CHARACTERISTICS, US DEL HAD PROPOSED AGREEMENT NOW ON BROAD TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS FOR NSS, AND ASSUMED THAT UPGRADED EQUIPMENT DESCRIBED BY SOVIET DEL FOR SECOND STAGE COULD BE THAT BEING DEVELOPED AND TESTED IN US. SIMILARLY, WE ASSUMED KEYWORD AUTHENTICATION  
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METHOD PROPOSED BY US DEL WOULD BE AN ACCEPTABLE APPROACH TO AUTHENTICATION. ON SOVIET DEL SUGGESTION FOR EXCHANGE OF NSS DATA ON MAGNETIC TAPES, WE COULD OFFER A NUMBER OF ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE DISADVANTAGES OF THAT APPROACH, BUT FIRST WE WANTED TO BETTER UNDERSTAND SOVIET VIEW OF FUNCTIONING OF PROCESS. US DEL UNDERSTOOD PROPOSAL TO MEAN THAT ALL DATA FROM THE STATIONS, RECORDED ON A ROUND-THE-CLOCK BASIS, WOULD BE EXCHANGED. FAKLEY (UK) OFFERED SEVERAL QUESTIONS ON THE FIRST STAGE OF THE SOVIET DEL PROPOSAL, ASKING WHEN DATA EXCHANGE COULD BEGIN AND WHICH EXISTING STATIONS WOULD BE USED. COULD THERE BE PROVISION FOR ESTABLISHING NEW SEISMIC STATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THIS STAGE?

3. AT JULY 25 MEETING, TARASOV RESPONDED TO US DEL VIEWS BY READING STATEMENT (SEPTTEL) OUTLINING IN MORE DETAIL SOVIET DEL PROPOSALS FOR EXCHANGING ADDITIONAL SEISMIC DATA UNDER THE SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT. SOVIET DEL HAD PROPOSED A TWO-STAGE APPROACH TO EXCHANGING ADDITIONAL SEISMIC INFORMATION, WITH THE TIMING FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION TO BE DECIDED IN THE JCC. IN THE INITIAL STAGE, EXISTING SEISMIC STATIONS WITH EXISTING EQUIPMENT

WOULD BE USED. SOVIET DEL FELT THAT A SATISFACTORY NETWORK COULD BE SELECTED FROM EXISTING STATIONS AND THAT THEREFORE IT WAS PREMATURE TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING STATIONS AT ENTIRELY NEW LOCATIONS. HOWEVER, IF THE NECESSITY AROSE AT A LATER STAGE, STATIONS AT NEW LOCATIONS COULD BE INSTALLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES AGREED UPON IN THE JCC.

4. FOR THE SECOND STAGE, THE SOVIET DEL PROPOSED THAT THE

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UPGRADED EQUIPMENT FOR NSS SHOULD HAVE AGREED BASIC TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS, INCLUDING (A) FREQUENCY RANGE, (B) DYNAMIC RANGE, (C) TIMING ACCURACY, (D) INTERNAL NOISE LEVEL, AND (E) CALIBRATION PROCEDURES. IT WOULD BE BEST TO INCLUDE ONLY THIS LIST OF CHARACTERISTICS IN THE SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT, WITH THE SPECIFIC VALUES TO BE AGREED IN THE JCC, BUT SOVIET DEL COULD IN PRINCIPLE CONSIDER OTHER APPROACHES IF MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS WERE FOUND ON OTHER ISSUES RELATED TO SEISMIC DATA EXCHANGE UNDER THE SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT. SOVIET DEL BELIEVED THAT US SHOULD NOT NECESSARILY MANUFACTURE EQUIPMENT, BUT THAT PARTIES SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO USE ANY SEISMIC STATIONS OF THEIR OWN DESIGN OR ANY OTHER STATION WHICH MET THE AGREED BASIC TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS.

5. AS FOR EXCHANGE OF DATA ON MAGNETIC TAPES, SOVIET DEL

HAD PROPOSED THAT RECORDING WOULD OCCUR CONTINUOUSLY AND THAT ALL DATA RECORDED WOULD BE EXCHANGED ON A REGULAR BASIS. IN VIEW OF THE LIMITED DURATION OF THE TREATY AND  
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THE UNCERTAINTY ABOUT EXTENDING IT, WHICH WAS NOT USSR'S FAULT, EXCHANGE OF SEISMIC DATA SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN LEAST COSTLY WAY. THE SCHEDULE FOR EXCHANGING TAPES DID NOT SEEM PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT, SINCE THE AVAILABILITY OF ALL THE DATA RECORDED AT THE STATIONS WAS THE MOST IMPORTANT ASPECT. FURTHERMORE, IT WOULD BE DISCRIMINATORY TO HAVE DIFFERENT SCHEDULES FOR DATA EXCHANGE IN THE SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE.

6. FINALLY, TARASOV SAID THAT METHOD OF AUTHENTICATION AND THE TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AUTHENTICATION DEVICE TO BE USED HAD TO BE AGREED ON, AND THE METHOD THE US HAD SUGGESTED WAS MOST INTERESTING. HE ASKED THAT THE US DEL OFFER A DETAILED PROPOSAL ON THE METHOD OF AUTHENTICATION, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DEVICE AND ITS ALGORITHM. ISSUES RELATED TO MANUFACTURING AND INSTALLING THE AUTHENTICATION DEVICE SHOULD BE RESOLVED AFTER AGREEING ON THESE BASIC PROVISIONS.

7. FINCH AND FAKLEY OFFERED INITIAL COMMENTS AND SOUGHT CLARIFICATION OF SOME ASPECTS OF TARASOV'S STATEMENT. IN RESPONSE TO FINCH'S SUGGESTION THAT WE TRY TO REACH AGREEMENT IN CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS ON TARGET DATES FOR INSTALLING IMPROVED SEISMIC EQUIPMENT, TARASOV SAID HE THOUGHT THE LENGTH OF EACH STAGE MIGHT BE AGREED DURING THESE NEGOTIATIONS, WITH SPECIFIC DATES FOR ESTABLISHING UPGRADED STATIONS TO BE AGREED IN JCC. FINCH PRESSED SOVIET DEL ON ROLE OF JCC, EMPHASIZING THAT WE WERE IN POSITION TO AGREE NOW ON TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS US DEL HAD OUTLINED IN EARLIER PRESENTATIONS. IN REPLY, TARASOV SAID SOVIET DEL CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT TREATY SHOULD NOT HAVE EXCESSIVE DETAIL. THESE DETAILS COULD  
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BE AGREED IN JCC; SOVIETS WOULD OBSERVE THEIR OBLIGATION TO DO SO. TARASOV NOTED IN PASSING THAT UNLIKE THE US AND UK, THE SOVIET UNION CARRIED OUT MANY LARGE CHEMICAL EXPLOSIONS OF 100 TONS OR MORE FOR CONSTRUCTION PURPOSES. THERE WAS SERIOUS CONCERN ABOUT HOW SEISMIC DATA ON SUCH EXPLOSIONS WOULD BE INTERPRETED AND THIS

WAS AN EXAMPLE OF HOW NSS MIGHT NOT INCREASE TRUST BUT ONLY LEAD TO UNNECESSARY CONSEQUENCES.

8. FINCH NOTED, IN RESPONSE TO TARASOV'S SUGGESTION THAT US PROVIDE MORE DETAILED LANGUAGE ON AUTHENTICATION, THAT LANGUAGE ALREADY SUGGESTED FOR TECHNICAL ANNEX WAS ALL US FELT WAS NECESSARY. TARASOV REPLIED THAT SINCE WE HAD A COMMON GENERAL APPROACH TO AUTHENTICATION, WE SHOULD NOW TRY TO AGREE IN MORE DETAIL. IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO TALK ABOUT OTHER DETAILS IN THE US DEL PROPOSED TECHNICAL ANNEX; THERE MIGHT ULTIMATELY BE NO NEED FOR A TECHNICAL ANNEX AT ALL. JOHNSON

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